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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, a
corporation,

Case No.
7755

Defendant and Respondent,

and GORDON RAY, doing business ·
under the name RAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THE MOUNTAIN STATES
TEL. & TEL. COMPANY
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This is an action at law upon a theory of negligence
for the recovery of damages to the plaintiff's telephone
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line. There is no dispute herein as to the manner of occurrence of plaintiff's damage. Appellant's gasoline truck
and tank trailer ran twelve feet from the edge of State
Highway 30 near Brigham City, Utah, and collided with
a high transmission tower, breaking the concrete base of
the tower and the electric wires on it and causing a gasoline
explosion and fire which burned plaintiff's telephone pole
and wires. The action was tried to the court without a
jury, and the trial court made its findings of fact herein,
finding that appellant was negligent in the manner of
operation of its truck and trailer at the time and place of
the said occurrence and that its negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. The damage was stipulated in the amount of Four Hundred Sixty-one Dollars
($461.00), and judgment was made and entered in favor
of plaintiff and against appellant in that amount. Although
appellant's statement of facts shows that the plaintiff's
damage resulted in the manner set out above, it does not
either fully or clearly set forth the evidence upon which
the trial court's findings of negligence and proximate cause
were made. The following statement of facts is therefore
essential.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's driver was operating a gasoline truck and
tank trailer in a westerly direction on State Highway 30
en route from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Tremonton, Utah
(R. 21). Appellant was carrying a cargo of 7200 gallons
of explosive gasoline ( R. 21) . The occurrence took place
at approximately 6 o'clock a. m. on the morning of Feb-
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ruary 14, 1949, about three miles west of Brigham City,
Utah (R. 21, 93).
The following evidence shows that the appellant's
driver should reasonably have known of the dangerous and
unsafe condition of the highway. It was a winter of extraordinarily heavy snow (R. 21). The said Highway 30 between Brigham City, Utah, and the point of accident was
at a number of different places covered with ice and snow
and there was small drifts of snow over the highway at
different locations (R. 45, 55, 85, 103). Appellant's driver
had been over the same stretch of road about six hours
earlier en route from Tremonton, Utah, to Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 36, 37) ~

:.:;
··:G~
~.

::;;

~(':

With full opportunity to have realized the dangerous
conditions of the road, appellant's driver approached the
point of the accident o·blivious to,_ the said conditions o·f the
road. It was his belief that the road was dry between
Brigham City, Utah, and the point of the accident (R. 21,
22, 32). The said driver had stopped in Brigham City,
Utah, a few minutes before the accident for coffee because
he was sleepy (R. 50) . Despite the said conditions of the
highway and the dangerous cargo which he was carrying,
appellant's driver negligently and carelessly approached
the point of the accident at a speed of probably 40 miles
and not less than 30 miles an hour (R. 24, 40, 103).

Apart from any prior notice of the conditions of the
;,~ highway as set out above, appellant's driver had actual fore:c~~ warning of the condition of the road at and near the place
gofl of the accident as he approached said place. Appellant's
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driver saw that there were snow banks and ice and snow
on and about the highway at the place of the accident (R.
23). Appellant's driver saw that the width of the cleared
portion of the road at the point of the accident was narrow
(R. 24). Appellant's driver had this knowledge and an
opportunity to act accordingly before he ever entered the
drifted and snow covered area of the highway at the point
of the accident (R. 24). Despite this knowledge of the
conditions of the highway, appellant's driver either failed
entirely to reduce the speed of his truck and trailer or re·
duced it only slightly (R. 24, 56).
As appellant's driver approached the drifted and snow
covered area of the highway at the point of the accident
and before he entered said area he could see a truck approaching from the opposite direction at least a mile off
(R. 36). The approaching vehicle gave appellant's driver
a one-flash light signal, which to truck drivers meant "caution" (R. 61, 62). In answer to this signal, appellant's
driver responded with a two-flash light signal, which to
truck drivers meant "okay, keep coming" (R. 38, 62). Appellant's driver negligently and unreasonably failed to heed
the caution signal given to him by the approaching vehicle
and negligently and carelessly failed to respond to the situation by giving the approaching vehicle a caution signal.
The force of the impact of appellant's truck with the
electric high transmission tower and the length of the tire
tracks left by appellant's truck and trailer in the snow
clearly show the high and dangerous rate of speed at which
appellant's truck and trailer must have been driven as
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they approached the point of the accident. The tire tracks
left by appellant's truck and trailer in the snow from the
point where the truck left the highway to the point of collision with the electric tower were 200 feet in length. (R.
87). The said tracks ran through snow 36 inches deep
(R. 45, 87). The impact of appellant's truck with the said
high transmission tower was sufficiently great to break
a concrete pillar about 12 inches square at the base of the
electric tower, causing the tower and its wires to fall (R.
46, 49).
The record does not indicate that any reasonable effort
was made by the appellant's driver to 'control· the movement of his truck and trailer after it left the highway. The
point of the collision was located 12 feet from the edge of
the hard surface of the highway (R. 82). The tracks in the
snow left by the appellant's truck and trailer ran in a perfectly straight line veering gradually from the highway
to the point of the collision (R. 87). Appellant's driver
admitted to Highway Patrolman Sackett immediately after
the accident that the cause of the occurrence was that he
had gotten into the narrow area of the road and that the
movement of his truck and trailer was such that when he
tried to slow down he lost control of the truck and trailer
and skidded off the road (R. 39, 99, 100).
No claim was made by appellant's driver after the
accident that he had been crowded from the road (R. 39).
It appears clear from the record that the width of the
road at the point of the accident was such that if appellant's driver had been operating his truck and trailer at a
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reasonable rate of speed he could have passed vehicles approaching from the opposite direction without departing
12 feet from the highway (R. 47, 48, 61, 69, 99). The appellant's truck and the approaching truck in fact passed
in the narrow area before appellant turned off the road
(R. 56).

ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
APPELLANT WAS NEGLIGENT AT THE TIME
AND PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT AND THAT
HIS NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE.
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING OF
NEGLIGENCE.
This is an action at law. The Court is here called
upon to review certain findings of fact made by the trial
court, sitting without a jury. No principle of law could
be more clearly established than the one which this court
has, time and time again, repeated with respect to this
question. That principle is that it is not the function or the
province of the appella~ court to determine what it or
other reasonable minds would have concluded from the evidence, but rather to determine whether there is any competent evidence to support the trial court's findings.

Beagley v. United States Gypsum Company, ...
Utah ... , 235 P. (2d) 783.
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The following pertinent statement was made by this Court
in Tuft v. Brotherson, 106 Utah 499, 150 P. (2d) 384:
"This is an action at law and the court, having
the witnesses before it and being able to observe
their conduct and demeanor on the witness stand,
was in a better position to pass upon the evidence
than is the appellate court. Under such circumstances, where there is evidence to support the court's
findings, they will not be upset on appeal."

I

~:

The essential question on this appeal is, therefore,
whether there is competent evidence from which the trial
court could find, as it did, that appellant was negligent
and his negligence the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. Plaintiff and respondent submits that· there is sufficient competent evidence from which the trial court could
find, as it did, that the appellant was negligent at and
prior to the time and place of the said occurrence.
The evidence shows that it was a winter of bad snows
and that the highway on which appellant's driver was traveling was at different places covered with ice and snow
(R. 54, 55, 85, 93, 103). Appellant's driver had been over
the same stretch of road about six hours prior to the occurrence (R. 36, 37). Appellant's truck and trailer contained 7200 gallons of explosive gasoline (R. 21). Appellant's driver was traveling 40 to 30 miles and hour as he
approached the point of the accident ( R. 24, 103) . Certainly the trial court could reasonably find from this evidence that appellant's truck and trailer were being driven
at a rate of speed which was unreasonable and dangerous
under the circumstances, those circumstances being the
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nature of the cargo and the hazardous condition of the
road.
As appellant's driver approached the point of the accident, he had forewarning of the general condition of the
road, and he had particular notice of the narrow area in
the road caused by snow drifts (R. 23, 24). With knowledge of this condition of the road, appellant's driver reduced his speed only slightly, if at all (R. 24, 56). Certainly the trial court could find that this constituted a
failure to exercise reasonable care.
As appellant's driver approached the point of the
accident and saw the condition of the road, he could see a
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction a distance
of about one mile off (R. 36). The approaching vehicle
gave a "caution" signal to which appellant's driver responded with an "okay, come ahead" signal (R. 37, 61, 62).
Certainly the trial court could find from this evidence that
appellant's driver, knowing said condition of·the highway,
was negligent in giving the approaching vehicle a "come
ahead" signal and in failing at that time, with knowledge
of the conditions of the road, to give the approaching vehicle a caution signal.
There is evidence that as appellant's driver finally attempted to reduce his speed, the tank trailer turned sideways, and that the said movement of the tank trailer pulled
appellant's truck and trailer off the road and into the high
transmission tower (R. 39, 99, 100). Certainly the Court
could reasonably find from that evidence that the truck
and trailer were being operated at a rate of speed which
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was unreasonable under the circumstances because it did
not allow appellant's driver to control the movement of the
truck and trailer.
-.

:-:

-..:

Appellant's truck and trailer moved 200 feet through
snow 36 inches deep and finally came to rest upon impact
with a concrete pillar ten or twelve inches square, which
concrete pillar was broken by the impact (R. 45, 46, 49,
87). Certainly the Court could find from that evidence
that the truck was being operated as it approached the
point of the accident at an unreasonable and dangerous
rate of speed?
, The evidence is that the appellant's driver was entirely
unaware that there was snow and ice on the road at different. places between Brigham City and the point of .the
accident, in face of the testimony of all other witnesses
that there was ice and snow on the highway (R. 21, 22).
Appellant's driver had stopped in Brigham City for coffee
because he was sleepy, according to his own admission (R.
50). The trial court could reasonably find from that evidence that appellant's driver failed to possess the alertness
and failed to maintain the lookout of a reasonably prudent
truck driver?

.:.·

The tracks left by appellant's truck and trailer in the
snow indicated no movement or attempt by appeHant's
driver to turn back toward the road (R. 87). The trial
court could reasonably find from that evidence that the
appellant's driver used poor and unreasonable judgment in
turning from the road· and failed to make a reasonable
effort to control the movement of his truck and trailer
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after leaving the road, even if it believed that the driver
turned from the highway intentionally.
Viewing the evidence as a whole, apart from any specific part of it, there was certainly sufficient competent
evidence from which the trial court could reasonably find
that appellant was negligent in the manner of operation of
its truck and trailer at and prior to the time and· place of
the occurrence.
The foregoing discussion has been made upon the
assumption that the standard of care required of appellant in transporting gasoline over the highways was ordinary care. There is considerable authority for the proposition, however, that the standard of care imposed under
such circumstances is of the highest degree.

Burnhardt v. American Glycerine Co., 113 Kan.
136, 213 Pac. 663 ;
Ladlie v. American Glycerine Co.,
Kan.... ,
223 Pac. 272 ;
Annotation, 31 A. L. R. 725;
Annotation,· 44 A. L. R. 124.
B. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.
The essential question with respect to proximate cause
is whether there is competent evidence upon which the trial
court could find that appellant's driver should reasonably
have foreseen that his aforesaid conduct constituted a risk
of harm to persons and property on and about the highway.
There can be no question but that plaintiff's damage was a
direct result of the operation of appellant's truck. Surely
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a reasonably prudent driver operating a truck and trailer
containing 7200 gallons of gasoline on an ice and snow
covered highway could and would foresee that a high rate
of speed and failure to maintain a lookout would endanger
property on and about the highway. Both the risk of harm
to plaintiff's property and the damage itself were a probable
and foreseeable result of appellant's negligence. It is well
settled in this jurisdiction, as well as in most other jurisdictions, that negligence is the proximate cause of damage
even though the actor was not able to foresee the injury in
the precise form in which it occurred or to anticipate the
precise damage which flowed from his negligence.
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46,
234 Pac. 300.
Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lumber Co., 45
Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121.
38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 62.
Restatement, Law of Torts, Volume 2, Section
435.

It is clear from the decisions of this Court that the
driver of a truck transporting and handling gasoline is
charged with knowledge that gasoline is highly volatile and
will ignite readily causing damage to person and property
in the area.
Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 45 P. 2d 561.
This principle would seem to make it clear that appellant should reasonably have foreseen that his conduct constituted a risk of harm to plaintiff's property and other
property in the area.
Appellant would appear to argue in his brief that
despite his conduct at and near the time and place of the
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accident the real cause of plaintiff's damage was conduct
on the part of the driver of an approaching truck; appellant's argument is that his truck was the first in the narrow
and drifted stretch of the highway and that he was forced
from the road. This argument completely ignores the evidence upon which the trial court based its findings. That
evidence is as follows: Appellant's driver saw the truck
approaching from the opposite direction when the latter
was about a mile away. Appellant's truck had not then
entered the snow covered and drifted part of the highway.
Appellant's driver gave the approaching track an "Okay,
come ahead" signal. Appellant's driver made no claim whatsoever after the collision that he had been crowded from
the highway. The said driver admitted to the patrolman
Sackett that the cause of the accident was that when he
attempted to slow down his truck skidded and pulled him
off the road.
Apart from the foregoing evidence which disproves appellant's argument as to the facts, appellant's contention is
incorrect as a matter of law. Negligence on the part of a
third party concurring with appellant's negligence to produce plaintiff's damage does not relieve appellant of liability.
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
61 Utah 116, 211 Pac. 706.
Whether the conduct of the driver of the approaching
truck was negligent or not, it was conduct which appellant's driver could reasonably foresee. Certainly appellant's
driver could not reasonably assume that the approaching
vehicle would stop and allow him to speed through the snow
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covered and drifted area on the highway. A reasonably
prudent driver should foresee that approaching vehicles will
make use of the highway. The negligence, if any, on the part
of the driver of the approaching truck was reasonably foreseeable and did not constitute an independent sup~rseding
cause of plaintiff's damage. The applicable principle of law
followed by this and a great majority of jurisdictions is
stated in Section 447 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
Vol. II, as follows :
"The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding cause of
harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
"(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or
"(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation
existing when the act of the third person
was done would not regard it as highly
extraordinary that the third person had
so acted, or
" (c) the intervening act is a normal response
to a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done
is not extraordinarily negligent."
Plaintiff submits, therefore, that there is sufficient
competent evidence from which the trial court could find as
it did that appellant's negligence was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's damage. Appellant cannot absolve himself
from liability as to this plaintiff by claiming that as between
him and a third party, both negligent, he had the right of
way.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY
OF WITNESS SACKETT REGARDING THE
SPEED OF APPELLANT'S TRUCK.
At the trial of this action a witness, Highway Patrolman Sackett, who had arrived at the point of the accident
a short time after its occurrence and who had conversation
with appellant's driver at said time and place, testified that
his best recollection was that appellant's driver had told
him he was traveling about forty miles an hour at and near
the time and place of the accident. Appellant's attorney objected to this testimony and asked that it be stricken on the
ground that it was not the best evidence. Appellant's request
that the evidence be stricken was denied by the court. The
argument is now made by appellant that the witness's testimony regarding the speed of forty miles an hour was made
on the basis of his inspection of a copy of the accident report and that the evidence was therefore incompetent.
Neither the objection made by appellant at the trial
of this action nor the objection now raised for the first time
on appeal has any merit.
The objection made by appeallant at the trial that the
officer's recollection was not the best evidence twists and
distorts well settled rules of evidence. Of course, the best
evidence as to a matter or occurrence is a witness's recollections as to his personal observations ; this rule is axiomatic and has never been questioned. What has been questioned
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by some courts is whether a witness may refresh his recollection by referring to written reports. Appellant would
change the rule to exclude evidence as to the independent
recollection of a witness and admit only evidence in the
form of a written report. This view is clearly erroneous.

Appellant's argument on appeal is that the testimony
of the officer relating to the speed of appellant's truck was
improperly admitted because it was based upon the officer's examination of a copy of the accident report. This,
it will appear, is an objection which was not made during
the trial. Furthermore, appellant's contention is not supported by the evidence.
Although the witness Sackett had access to the copy
of the accident report the evidence referred to by appellant at pages 12 and 13 of his brief does not disclose that
the said witness based his recollections on said copy of the
report. At most appellant's objection could go only to the
weight of the evidence and not its competency-the weight
to be given to the evidence was a matter for determination
by the trial court.
CONCLUSION

~.-

It is Respondent and Plaintiff's position that there is
sufficient competent evidence in the record from which
the trial court, sitting as the trier of facts and observing
at first hand the conduct and demeanor of witnesses could
find that appellant was negligent and his negligence the
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. Appellant is in
effect asking this Court to retry the facts of this action
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and substitute its judgment as to the facts in place of
findings of the trial court. The testimony of the witness
Sackett with respect to appellant's driver's admission as
to his speed was competent evidence and the court did not
err in refusing to strike it. There is, however, evidence
apart from that which is sufficient to support the trial
court's findings. Respondent and Plaintiff submits that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
LEONARD J. LEWIS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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